PraisonAI SandlockSandbox falls back to unrestricted subprocess execution when Landlock is unavailable
CVE-2026-57144 · GHSA-6jcq-6546-qrrw · published 2026-06-18 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.8
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.21%
- Fixed in
- 4.6.61
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
If a PraisonAI user or service relies on SandlockSandbox / native sandboxing for untrusted code isolation on a host without the required Landlock support, code submitted to the sandbox can execute with the host user's normal filesystem and network access. Concrete impact includes: reading files outside the configured tenant/workspace path; reading project files, credentials, .env files, SSH material, or cloud config reachable by the PraisonAI process user; connecting to loopback or internal services despite network=False; moving from sandboxed code execution to unsandboxed host-user code execution in deployments that treat Sandlock as the isolation boundary.
Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.61 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fail closed when the requested native sandbox boundary cannot be enforced. Recommended changes: 1. In SandlockSandbox.execute() and runcommand(), return a failed SandboxResult or raise a clear runtime error when self.isavailable is false. 2. If fallback behavior is kept for developer convenience, require an explicit opt-in such as allowdegraded=True or fallback="subprocess" and surface that degraded state in the result metadata. 3. Do not preserve sandboxtype == "sandlock" in status metadata when the actual execution backend is subprocess. 4. Add regression tests proving that unavailable Landlock does not execute code unless degraded fallback was explicitly requested. 5.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonai | PyPI | >= 4.5.110, < 4.6.61 | 4.6.61 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.