PraisonAI: SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass
CVE-2026-57115 · GHSA-6h9p-93hq-q7h6 · published 2026-06-18 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.43%
- Fixed in
- 1.6.59
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
An attacker who can influence a URL passed to scrapepage(), extractlinks(), crawl(), or extract_text() can cause the PraisonAI process to request destinations that SpiderTools is designed to block. Potential impact includes: reading loopback-only HTTP services; probing or reading private network services reachable from the PraisonAI host; reading link-local/cloud metadata endpoints if reachable in the deployment environment. The PoV demonstrates returned response-body disclosure from a loopback-only service. This report does not claim arbitrary code execution or live cloud credential theft without deployment-specific evidence.
Upgrade praisonaiagents to 1.6.59 or later.
Disable automatic redirects in scrapepage(): If redirects should remain supported, follow them manually and validate every Location target before each hop using the same SSRF guard: require http or https; resolve and validate every redirect hostname; reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, unspecified, internal, and metadata destinations; cap redirect count; apply the same safe fetch path to scrapepage(), extractlinks(), crawl(), and extracttext(). Regression tests should cover direct loopback rejection, public-to-loopback redirect rejection, public-to-public redirects if supported, and all scrape_page() callers.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonaiagents | PyPI | <= 1.6.58 | 1.6.59 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.