n8n: Bypass "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" Credential Restriction in Multiple AI and LLM Nodes
GHSA-64xh-79j6-r5v8 · published 2026-07-22
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.32.1
The credential "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" allowlist was intended to restrict which hosts a credential's secret could be sent to, protecting shared credentials from users who could use but not view them. Several AI/LLM nodes did not enforce this allowlist when a user-supplied base or endpoint URL was set. A low-privileged workflow editor with use-only access to such a shared credential could point one of these nodes at an attacker-controlled host and cause the credential secret to be transmitted there, then reuse it against the underlying service. Only instances where a credential has "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" configured and is shared with non-owner users are affected.
Upgrade n8n to 2.32.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.31.5 and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. Restrict credential sharing to fully trusted users only. Audit credentials with domain restrictions for unexpected sharing relationships. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.