n8n Vulnerable to Arbitrary Command Execution in Pyodide based Python Code Node
CVE-2025-68668 · GHSA-62r4-hw23-cc8v · published 2025-12-26 · updated 2026-01-05
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS score
- 9.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 13.2%
- Fixed in
- 2.0.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
A sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the Python Code Node that uses Pyodide. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the host system running n8n, using the same privileges as the n8n process.
Upgrade n8n to 2.0.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
In n8n version 1.111.0, a task-runner-based native Python implementation was introduced as an optional feature, providing a more secure isolation model. To enable it, you need to configure the N8NRUNNERSENABLED and N8NNATIVEPYTHON_RUNNER environment variables. This implementation became the default starting with n8n version 2.0.0.
Disable the Code Node by setting the environment variable (Docs) Disable Python support in the Code node by setting the environment variable N8NPYTHONENABLED=false, which was introduced in n8n version 1.104.0. Configure n8n to use the task runner based Python sandbox via the N8NRUNNERSENABLED and N8NNATIVEPYTHON_RUNNER environment variables. (Docs)
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| n8n | npm | >= 1.0.0, < 2.0.0 | 2.0.0 |
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- HighLiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardraillitellmExploited
- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
- Criticalmem0ai Databricks vector store vulnerable to SQL injectionmem0ai
- CriticalFlowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromiumflowise, flowise-components
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- Criticaln8n Has an Arbitrary File Read via Git Noden8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n: HTTP Request Node Pagination Prototype Pollution to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypassn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has XML Node Prototype Pollution that to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has Prototype Pollution in XML Webhook Body Parser that Leads to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.