PraisonAI: SecurityPolicy command/path/import restrictions are completely unenforced by the default SubprocessSandbox backend
CVE-2026-60085 · GHSA-5r6c-gj4g-r697 · published 2026-10-08
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.7
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.26%
- Fixed in
- 4.6.78
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Summary SecurityPolicy in praisonaiagents/sandbox/config.py is a documented configuration data class with fields for allowsubprocess, allowedpaths, blockedpaths, allowedcommands, blockedcommands, allowedimports, and blockedimports. The default sandbox backend, Subprocess Sandbox (praisonai/sandbox/subprocess.py), implements code/command execution by writing input to a temp file and invoking it via asyncio.createsubprocessexec() directly, with no checking of any kind against blockedcommands, blockedimports, blockedpaths, allowsubprocess, or allowfilewrite.
Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.78 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonai | PyPI | <= 4.6.77 | 4.6.78 |
1 registered MCP server installs an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.