Unescaped Parameter Interpolation into Third-Party Query Languages Enables Filter Bypass and Bulk Data Disclosure
GHSA-5pg9-2vqx-r6jm · published 2026-09-16
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.40.1
The SendGrid, Freshservice, and ServiceNow nodes constructed third-party query or filter strings by directly interpolating bindable node parameters into DSL literals without neutralising the delimiter. When such a parameter is bound to untrusted external input an attacker can break out of the intended literal and widen a single-record lookup into a match-all or filter-bypass query against the upstream service. This can expose data beyond the intended record within the upstream tenant's scope, including contact lists, ticket and asset records, and directory entries. Exploitation requires the workflow to be configured to bind the vulnerable node parameter to untrusted external input.
Upgrade n8n to 2.40.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.40.1 and 2.39.6. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Audit workflows that use the SendGrid, Freshservice, or ServiceNow nodes and ensure that filter or query parameters are not bound directly to untrusted external input such as webhook or HTTP request fields. Deactivate webhook-triggered workflows that pass external input into the affected nodes until the instance is patched. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.