fickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`
GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8h · published 2026-03-13
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.9
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 0.1.10
False-negative verdict: checksafety() returns LIKELYSAFE with zero findings for a pickle that invokes a subprocess with attacker-controlled arguments. Subprocess invocation: platform.syscmdfile calls command reads file headers and returns type information, enabling file existence and type probing. File read: platform.libc_ver opens and reads chunks of an attacker-specified file path.
Upgrade fickling to 0.1.10 or later.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| fickling | PyPI | <= 0.1.9 | 0.1.10 |
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- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.