PraisonAI: FastContext path resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace
CVE-2026-61432 · GHSA-4xxv-6wmf-xf45 · published 2026-10-08
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.7
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Fixed in
- 1.6.78
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
If an application exposes FastContext to lower-trust prompts or users, the attacker can cause the PraisonAI process to read files outside the intended workspace and return the contents through tool results or high-level FastContext APIs. Practical impacts include disclosure of source files, logs, prompt transcripts, API keys, local configuration, cloud credentials, and other process-readable text files. grepsearch can search outside directories for secrets, globsearch and listdirectory can enumerate outside file names and metadata, and readfile/read_context can return file contents. The demonstrated impact is confidentiality.
Upgrade praisonaiagents to 1.6.78 or later.
Make FastContext path resolution fail closed around a single workspace-containment helper: 1. Resolve the configured workspace once. 2. For every FastContext path argument, reject absolute paths outside the workspace, join relative paths to the workspace, resolve the candidate, and require candidate.relativeto(workspace) to succeed. 3. Apply this helper in FastContextAgent.executetool() for grepsearch, globsearch, readfile, and listdirectory. 4. Apply the same helper before adding model-generated tool calls to ToolCallBatch in FastContextAgent.search(). Do not call the raw searchtools functions with model-supplied paths. 5. Apply the same helper in FastContext.readcontext(). 6.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonaiagents | PyPI | <= 1.6.77 | 1.6.78 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.