Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication
CVE-2026-49357 · GHSA-4hf8-5mjm-rfgq · published 2026-06-26
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.8
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.56%
- Fixed in
- 1.1.2
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
An unauthenticated network client can read LINE chat history through the MCP history tools and can send LINE messages through the send-message tools, including sendmessageauto when the tool call requests immediate sending. The attacker does not need LINE credentials or a LINE API token; they only need network reachability to the MCP HTTP port. The practical impact is disclosure of private LINE conversations and unauthorized messages sent as the logged-in desktop user.
Upgrade line-desktop-mcp to 1.1.2 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Require authentication before accepting Streamable HTTP MCP sessions or tool calls. For example: require a bearer token or local secret when --http-mode is used; bind HTTP mode to 127.0.0.1 by default unless the operator explicitly opts into network exposure; refuse to start 0.0.0.0 HTTP mode without authentication; document that host.docker.internal / n8n setups must still authenticate to the MCP server. A defense-in-depth improvement would also keep sendmessageauto disabled unless explicitly enabled by a server-side flag, because it converts MCP tool access into immediate message sending as the desktop user.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| line-desktop-mcp | npm | <= 1.1.1 | 1.1.2 |
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- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalTodoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server@doist/todoist-mcp
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.