Chat Hub: chat-only users can register tool types the product already tries to sandbox
GHSA-43v8-hjhm-chjp · published 2026-10-14
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.44.1
Chat Hub blocked only a few tool types for users with the chat user role. A chat user cannot create or edit workflows, but could still add Chat Hub tools that run code in the task runner sandbox, read and write files in the directories that n8n allows, or use the workflows, Data Tables and agents of the instance, and then run these tools through a chat. A chat user could therefore act beyond the limits of their role.
Upgrade n8n to 2.44.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.85, 2.43.5, and 2.44.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Do not assign the global:chatUser role to any user who is not fully trusted until the instance is patched. Disable Chat Hub if it is not required. Use the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable to remove high-risk node types from the instance if they are not needed. Enable N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=true to reduce the impact of outbound request abuse. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- HighLiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardraillitellmExploited
- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
- Criticalmem0ai Databricks vector store vulnerable to SQL injectionmem0ai
- CriticalFlowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromiumflowise, flowise-components
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- Criticaln8n Has an Arbitrary File Read via Git Noden8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n: HTTP Request Node Pagination Prototype Pollution to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypassn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has XML Node Prototype Pollution that to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has Prototype Pollution in XML Webhook Body Parser that Leads to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.