OpenClaw: Non-owner command-authorized sender can change the owner-only `/send` session delivery policy
CVE-2026-35620 · GHSA-39mp-545q-w789 · published 2026-03-30 · updated 2026-04-10
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.4
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.46%
- Fixed in
- 2026.3.24
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
The vulnerable handler performs a real persistent session-state change: /send inherit deletes sessionEntry.sendPolicy other modes assign the handler then calls persistSessionEntry(params) The mutation is not gated by owner status, only by general command authorization. That changes subsequent delivery behavior for the current session, which matches the documented meaning of sendPolicy.
Upgrade openclaw to 2026.3.24 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
1. Change /send to require owner status, not just command authorization. 2. Reuse the same owner-only rejection pattern already used by privileged command surfaces such as /config, /debug, and owner-only /plugins writes. 3. Add regression coverage for the exact case where: a non-owner sender is command-authorized; /send must still be rejected unless senderIsOwner === true. 4. Verify that the owner can still use /send on|off|inherit normally.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| openclaw | npm | < 2026.3.24 | 2026.3.24 |
- CriticalMarimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication BypassmarimoExploited
- CriticalLangflow CORS misconfiguration enables Account Takeover and RCElangflowExploited
- HighLiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough FallbacklitellmExploited
- HighLangflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User's FlowlangflowExploited
- CriticalTodoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server@doist/todoist-mcp
- CriticalLangflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypasslangflow
- CriticalOpenClaw: QQBot admin commands could skip DM-only and allowFrom policyopenclaw
- CriticalOpenClaw: Feishu webhook and card-action validation now fail closedopenclaw
- CriticalOpenClaw: Gateway HTTP endpoints re-resolve bearer auth after SecretRef rotationopenclaw
- CriticalOpenClaw: Sandbox escape via TOCTOU race in remote FS bridge readFileopenclaw
- CriticalOpenClaw: Heartbeat context inheritance bypasses sandbox via senderIsOwner escalationopenclaw
- CriticalOpenClaw has a CWD `.env` environment variable injection which bypasses host-env policy and allows config takeoveropenclaw
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.