Approval Bypass in the Send and Wait Node's Approve Within Chat Mode
GHSA-342v-gmh6-738j · published 2026-09-16
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 2.40.1
The approval gate in the Send and Wait node's "Approve Within Chat" mode could be bypassed: a resume request could be accepted without the verification that it came from Slack or Telegram, and without the approver allow-list, even where one was configured. Anyone who can see an approval message, with no n8n account or credentials, could advance a waiting execution and trigger the action it guards. Exploitation requires "Approve Within Chat" already in use on a publicly reachable HTTPS instance, and sight of the approval request for the execution targeted.
Upgrade n8n to 2.40.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.40.1 and 2.39.6. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Avoid using the "Approve Within Chat" mode for Send and Wait nodes that gate high-consequence actions until the instance is patched. Limit membership of the Telegram or Slack channels used for approvals to the minimum set of trusted users. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by n8n). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.