MCP Registry: OCI validator skips ownership check on upstream rate limits
CVE-2026-45781 · GHSA-2v5f-5r6w-p67r · published 2026-05-19
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS score
- 3.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.23%
- Fixed in
- 1.7.9
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
fails open on http.StatusTooManyRequests: when the registry's anonymous fetch to the upstream OCI registry is rate-limited, ValidateOCI returns nil and the publish is accepted without ever running the io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name label-match check at lines 122-141. That label check is the only cross-system ownership proof the registry applies to OCI packages — every other registry type (NPM, PyPI, NuGet, MCPB) treats a non-200 upstream response as a hard error. The fail-open trigger is attacker-controllable. …
Upgrade github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry to 1.7.9 or later.
Two options, either alone, or both for defence-in-depth: 1. Remove the fail-open. Replace with an error of the same shape the other validators use ( ). The handler call sites in validateRegistryOwnership already propagate the error to a 400 response. 2. Replace authn.Anonymous at internal/validators/registries/oci.go:97 with an authenticated token whose quota is isolated from organic anonymous traffic to the registry's egress IP. Docker Hub authenticated pulls are 200/6h per token; ghcr.io / quay.io / *.pkg.dev / *.azurecr.io each have their own auth flows. This removes the easy attacker-side trigger and reduces organic fail-open windows. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry | Go | < 1.7.9 | 1.7.9 |
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- HighLiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardraillitellmExploited
- HighLangflow affected by Remote Code Execution via validate_code() exec()langflowExploited
- CriticalJupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routesjupyter-mcp-server
- Criticalmem0ai Databricks vector store vulnerable to SQL injectionmem0ai
- MediumMCP Registry has an unauthenticated SSRF: HTTP namespace verification dials 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local IPv6 addresses, bypassing private-addrgithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry
- MediumMCP Registry vulnerable to stored XSS in catalogue UI via attribute-quote breakout in publisher-controlled `websiteUrl`github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry
- MediumMCP Registry has open redirect via protocol-relative path in trailing-slash middlewaregithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry
- LowMCP Registry's GitHub OIDC tokens are replayable across registry deployments due to shared audiencegithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.