PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, canc
CVE-2026-55539 · GHSA-2jgc-f764-c5r2 · published 2026-08-25
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.6
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.57%
- Fixed in
- 4.6.58
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Execution / cost: unauthenticated callers run arbitrary prompts against the operator's configured LLM credentials, and can queue long-running jobs (up to timeout, default 3600s) consuming CPU, memory, queue slots, and provider billing. Confidentiality: callers list all jobs (GET /api/v1/runs) and read completed results from the shared store — other callers' agent outputs. Integrity / control: callers cancel running jobs and delete terminal jobs. The realistic worst case is a reachable jobs endpoint used to run unauthorized prompts on the operator's LLM account, then enumerate and exfiltrate other jobs' outputs.
Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.58 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Mirror the fix already applied to the legacy Flask server (CVE-2026-44338), but for the jobs router: Add a jobs-server auth token (e.g. PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_TOKEN) and require it on every /api/v1/runs route via a router-level dependency, so future routes inherit protection by default. Use constant-time comparison (hmac.compare_digest / secrets.compare_digest). Add per-job ownership / scoped job tokens so one caller cannot list, read, cancel, or delete another caller's jobs. Keep 127.0.0.1 as default; warn or refuse when binding a public interface without auth configured. Regression tests asserting unauthenticated POST / GET / cancel / delete return 401 when auth is enabled.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonai | PyPI | < 4.6.58 | 4.6.58 |
1 registered MCP server installs an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.
- io.github.MervinPraison/praisonaipraisonai@2.3.42
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.