UTC
High

PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header

CVE-2026-61435 · GHSA-2gpf-2492-q9jh · published 2026-10-08

Severity
High
CVSS score
8.2
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.49%
Fixed in
4.6.78
  • Exploitation Public proof of concept
  • Automatable Yes
  • Technical impact Partial
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

An unauthenticated caller who can reach a PraisonAI call/serve API with PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled can bypass the intended localhost-only restriction by setting Host: 127.0.0.1. The PoV demonstrates both agent listing and direct invocation of a registered agent through /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke. Impact depends on the registered agents. In realistic deployments, agents may have tools, private context, workflow integrations, browser/file/API access, or paid model access. The same dependency also protects other agent registry routes, so the bypass undermines the access-control boundary for the mounted /api/v1/agents API family. …

What to do

Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.78 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

Do not derive bind safety from Request.url, the HTTP Host header, or any request-header-derived value. If PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled remains supported, decide whether it is allowed at startup from server-owned configuration, such as the actual configured bind host passed to Uvicorn or the serving command, and refuse to start in disabled-auth mode when the configured bind host is not loopback. Consider removing the HTTP auth opt-out entirely for network routes, or replacing it with an explicit local-development mode that is only available when the process is bound to 127.0.0.1, localhost, or ::1. …

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
praisonaiPyPI<= 4.6.774.6.78
Downstream in the Official MCP Registry

1 registered MCP server installs an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.

  • io.github.MervinPraison/praisonaipraisonai@2.3.42
See the trace →

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].