vLLM: Loose `cache_salt` validation lets a single request kill EngineCore on LMCache-MP deployments — uncaught downstream `ValueError` denia
CVE-2026-105756 · GHSA-2823-qmq8-rwvj · published 2026-10-05
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.33%
- Fixed in
- 0.30.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Availability only. cache_salt is an attacker-controlled, publicly reachable request field that vLLM validates too loosely. A value such as "/" passes vLLM's check, reaches the stricter downstream validator, and its ValueError is never converted into a request-scoped failure — instead it kills the EngineCore process, a denial of service for every concurrent request on that server (HTTP failures, then /health failing). Applicability: the built-in LMCache-MP KV connector must be enabled (lmcache >= 0.4.4), which is itself an opt-in KV-connector boundary. …
Upgrade vllm to 0.30.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Two independent fixes: 1. Tighten admission — add one shared validate_cache_salt() helper (for example in ) that matches or exceeds the downstream IPCCacheServerKey rules — reject @, /, \, NUL, and >128-character salts at the HTTP boundary with a 4xx — and route every request model that exposes cache_salt through it: the three check_cache_salt_support validators above, the pooling base request, and the token-in-token-out GenerateRequest (which has no validator today). 2. Defense in depth — wrap the LMCache-MP lookup call reached from Scheduler.schedule() so a downstream validator ValueError becomes a request-scoped failure instead of an EngineCore-fatal exception. …
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | PyPI | < 0.30.0 | 0.30.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.