Open WebUI: shared-chat branch ignores access_type, allowing unauthorized file deletion
CVE-2026-45671 · GHSA-26g9-27vm-x3q8 · published 2026-05-14 · updated 2026-05-15
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.0
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.27%
- Fixed in
- 0.9.0
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
Who is affected: Any multi-user Open WebUI deployment where chat sharing is enabled (the default). The attacker needs a valid account (any role) and a target file UUID, which is available through any shared knowledge base. What can happen: Permanent data destruction: The file is removed from the database, disk, and all knowledge base associations with no recovery mechanism. Knowledge base degradation: If the file was part of a RAG knowledge base, that KB silently loses the document with no user-facing indication that content is missing. No audit trail: The delete operation does not record which user performed it. Sharing a chat is a routine collaboration action. …
Upgrade open-webui to 0.9.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in commit 2e52ad8ff ("refac: shared chat"), first released in v0.9.0 (Apr 2026). The shared-chat feature was refactored to introduce a dedicated shared_chats table and gate shared-chat access through AccessGrants (resource_type='shared_chat'). has_access_to_file() (now in ) calls AccessGrants.get_accessible_resource_ids to filter the shared-chat IDs to only those the requesting user has an explicit grant on — ownership, group membership, or public share — before returning True The new gate is permission-aware ('read' here) and user-aware, closing both the "any user passes" issue and the "access_type ignored" issue. Users on >= 0.9.0 are not affected.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| open-webui | PyPI | <= 0.8.12 | 0.9.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.