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NIST AI 600-1 · NIST AI 100-1

NIST's generative AI risks and the AI RMF, at category level.

The 12 risks NIST AI 600-1 defines and the 9 AI RMF categories OWASP's 2026 crosswalk maps to, in NIST's words, with the OWASP LLM risks mapped to each.

NIST SP 2400-102e2026 · Initial public draft

Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations

NIST's taxonomy and terminology of attacks on AI systems and their mitigations. It builds on the NIST AI 100-2 series; NIST says this edition focuses on attacks on agentic systems.

Published 9 November 2026. Comments due 18 December 2026, as NIST's page said on 19 November 2026. The draft and how to comment →

NIST AI 600-1 · generative AI risks
  1. 1. CBRN Information or Capabilities

    Eased access to or synthesis of materially nefarious information or design capabilities related to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or other dangerous materials or agents.

  2. 2. Confabulation

    The production of confidently stated but erroneous or false content (known colloquially as “hallucinations” or “fabrications”) by which users may be misled or deceived.

    ○ LLM03:2026○ LLM04:2026● LLM07:2026○ LLM10:2026

  3. 3. Dangerous, Violent, or Hateful Content

    Eased production of and access to violent, inciting, radicalizing, or threatening content as well as recommendations to carry out self-harm or conduct illegal activities. Includes difficulty controlling public exposure to hateful and disparaging or stereotyping content.

    ○ LLM05:2026

  4. 4. Data Privacy

    Impacts due to leakage and unauthorized use, disclosure, or de-anonymization of biometric, health, location, or other personally identifiable information or sensitive data.

    ○ LLM01:2026● LLM02:2026○ LLM03:2026● LLM09:2026○ LLM10:2026

  5. 5. Environmental Impacts

    Impacts due to high compute resource utilization in training or operating GAI models, and related outcomes that may adversely impact ecosystems.

  6. 6. Harmful Bias or Homogenization

    Amplification and exacerbation of historical, societal, and systemic biases; performance disparities between sub-groups or languages, possibly due to non-representative training data, that result in discrimination, amplification of biases, or incorrect presumptions about performance; undesired homogeneity that skews system or model outputs, which may be erroneous, lead to ill-founded decision-making, or amplify harmful biases.

  7. 7. Human-AI Configuration

    Arrangements of or interactions between a human and an AI system which can result in the human inappropriately anthropomorphizing GAI systems or experiencing algorithmic aversion, automation bias, over-reliance, or emotional entanglement with GAI systems.

    ○ LLM01:2026○ LLM03:2026● LLM07:2026

  8. 8. Information Integrity

    Lowered barrier to entry to generate and support the exchange and consumption of content which may not distinguish fact from opinion or fiction or acknowledge uncertainties, or could be leveraged for large-scale dis- and mis-information campaigns.

    ○ LLM01:2026○ LLM04:2026● LLM05:2026● LLM07:2026● LLM09:2026

  9. 9. Information Security

    Lowered barriers for offensive cyber capabilities, including via automated discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities to ease hacking, malware, phishing, offensive cyber operations, or other cyberattacks; increased attack surface for targeted cyberattacks, which may compromise a system’s availability or the confidentiality or integrity of training data, code, or model weights.

    ● LLM01:2026● LLM02:2026● LLM03:2026● LLM04:2026● LLM05:2026● LLM06:2026○ LLM07:2026● LLM08:2026● LLM09:2026● LLM10:2026

  10. 10. Intellectual Property

    Eased production or replication of alleged copyrighted, trademarked, or licensed content without authorization (possibly in situations which do not fall under fair use); eased exposure of trade secrets; or plagiarism or illegal replication.

    ○ LLM02:2026○ LLM04:2026○ LLM06:2026○ LLM08:2026

  11. 11. Obscene, Degrading, and/or Abusive Content

    Eased production of and access to obscene, degrading, and/or abusive imagery which can cause harm, including synthetic child sexual abuse material (CSAM), and nonconsensual intimate images (NCII) of adults.

  12. 12. Value Chain and Component Integration

    Non-transparent or untraceable integration of upstream third-party components, including data that has been improperly obtained or not processed and cleaned due to increased automation from GAI; improper supplier vetting across the AI lifecycle; or other issues that diminish transparency or accountability for downstream users.

    ○ LLM02:2026● LLM04:2026● LLM05:2026○ LLM06:2026○ LLM07:2026○ LLM09:2026○ LLM10:2026

From section 2 of Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile.

NIST AI 100-1 · categories OWASP maps to
  • GOVERN 6

    Policies and procedures are in place to address AI risks and benefits arising from third-party software and data and other supply chain issues.

    ● LLM04:2026○ LLM05:2026

    • GOVERN 6.1 Policies and procedures are in place that address AI risks associated with third-party entities, including risks of infringement of a third-party’s intellectual property or other rights.
    • GOVERN 6.2 Contingency processes are in place to handle failures or incidents in third-party data or AI systems deemed to be high-risk.
  • MAP 4

    Risks and benefits are mapped for all components of the AI system including third-party software and data.

    ○ LLM01:2026● LLM04:2026○ LLM09:2026

    • MAP 4.1 Approaches for mapping AI technology and legal risks of its components – including the use of third-party data or software – are in place, followed, and documented, as are risks of infringement of a third party’s intellectual property or other rights.
    • MAP 4.2 Internal risk controls for components of the AI system, including third-party AI technologies, are identified and documented.
  • MAP 5

    Impacts to individuals, groups, communities, organizations, and society are characterized.

    ○ LLM02:2026○ LLM09:2026

    • MAP 5.1 Likelihood and magnitude of each identified impact (both potentially beneficial and harmful) based on expected use, past uses of AI systems in similar contexts, public incident reports, feedback from those external to the team that developed or deployed the AI system, or other data are identified and documented.
    • MAP 5.2 Practices and personnel for supporting regular engagement with relevant AI actors and integrating feedback about positive, negative, and unanticipated impacts are in place and documented.
  • MEASURE 1

    Appropriate methods and metrics are identified and applied.

    ○ LLM01:2026○ LLM07:2026

    • MEASURE 1.1 Approaches and metrics for measurement of AI risks enumerated during the MAP function are selected for implementation starting with the most significant AI risks. The risks or trustworthiness characteristics that will not – or cannot – be measured are properly documented.
    • MEASURE 1.2 Appropriateness of AI metrics and effectiveness of existing controls are regularly assessed and updated, including reports of errors and potential impacts on affected communities.
    • MEASURE 1.3 Internal experts who did not serve as front-line developers for the system and/or independent assessors are involved in regular assessments and updates. Domain experts, users, AI actors external to the team that developed or deployed the AI system, and affected communities are consulted in support of assessments as necessary per organizational risk tolerance.
  • MEASURE 2

    AI systems are evaluated for trustworthy characteristics.

    ○ LLM01:2026○ LLM02:2026○ LLM04:2026○ LLM05:2026○ LLM06:2026● LLM07:2026○ LLM08:2026

    • MEASURE 2.1 Test sets, metrics, and details about the tools used during TEVV are documented.
    • MEASURE 2.2 Evaluations involving human subjects meet applicable requirements (including human subject protection) and are representative of the relevant population.
    • MEASURE 2.3 AI system performance or assurance criteria are measured qualitatively or quantitatively and demonstrated for conditions similar to deployment setting(s). Measures are documented.
    • MEASURE 2.4 The functionality and behavior of the AI system and its components – as identified in the MAP function – are monitored when in production.
    • MEASURE 2.5 The AI system to be deployed is demonstrated to be valid and reliable. Limitations of the generalizability beyond the conditions under which the technology was developed are documented.
    • MEASURE 2.6 The AI system is evaluated regularly for safety risks – as identified in the MAP function. The AI system to be deployed is demonstrated to be safe, its residual negative risk does not exceed the risk tolerance, and it can fail safely, particularly if made to operate beyond its knowledge limits. Safety metrics reflect system reliability and robustness, real-time monitoring, and response times for AI system failures.
    • MEASURE 2.7 AI system security and resilience – as identified in the MAP function – are evaluated and documented.
    • MEASURE 2.8 Risks associated with transparency and accountability – as identified in the MAP function – are examined and documented.
    • MEASURE 2.9 The AI model is explained, validated, and documented, and AI system output is interpreted within its context – as identified in the MAP function – to inform responsible use and governance.
    • MEASURE 2.10 Privacy risk of the AI system – as identified in the MAP function – is examined and documented.
    • MEASURE 2.11 Fairness and bias – as identified in the MAP function – are evaluated and results are documented.
    • MEASURE 2.12 Environmental impact and sustainability of AI model training and management activities – as identified in the MAP function – are assessed and documented.
    • MEASURE 2.13 Effectiveness of the employed TEVV metrics and processes in the MEASURE function are evaluated and documented.
  • MEASURE 3

    Mechanisms for tracking identified AI risks over time are in place.

    ○ LLM04:2026○ LLM05:2026○ LLM07:2026

    • MEASURE 3.1 Approaches, personnel, and documentation are in place to regularly identify and track existing, unanticipated, and emergent AI risks based on factors such as intended and actual performance in deployed contexts.
    • MEASURE 3.2 Risk tracking approaches are considered for settings where AI risks are difficult to assess using currently available measurement techniques or where metrics are not yet available.
    • MEASURE 3.3 Feedback processes for end users and impacted communities to report problems and appeal system outcomes are established and integrated into AI system evaluation metrics.
  • MANAGE 1

    AI risks based on assessments and other analytical output from the MAP and MEASURE functions are prioritized, responded to, and managed.

    ○ LLM06:2026○ LLM07:2026

    • MANAGE 1.1 A determination is made as to whether the AI system achieves its intended purposes and stated objectives and whether its development or deployment should proceed.
    • MANAGE 1.2 Treatment of documented AI risks is prioritized based on impact, likelihood, and available resources or methods.
    • MANAGE 1.3 Responses to the AI risks deemed high priority, as identified by the MAP function, are developed, planned, and documented. Risk response options can include mitigating, transferring, avoiding, or accepting.
    • MANAGE 1.4 Negative residual risks (defined as the sum of all unmitigated risks) to both downstream acquirers of AI systems and end users are documented.
  • MANAGE 3

    AI risks and benefits from third-party entities are managed.

    ● LLM04:2026

    • MANAGE 3.1 AI risks and benefits from third-party resources are regularly monitored, and risk controls are applied and documented.
    • MANAGE 3.2 Pre-trained models which are used for development are monitored as part of AI system regular monitoring and maintenance.
  • MANAGE 4

    Risk treatments, including response and recovery, and communication plans for the identified and measured AI risks are documented and monitored regularly.

    ○ LLM02:2026○ LLM03:2026○ LLM09:2026

    • MANAGE 4.1 Post-deployment AI system monitoring plans are implemented, including mechanisms for capturing and evaluating input from users and other relevant AI actors, appeal and override, decommissioning, incident response, recovery, and change management.
    • MANAGE 4.2 Measurable activities for continual improvements are integrated into AI system updates and include regular engagement with interested parties, including relevant AI actors.
    • MANAGE 4.3 Incidents and errors are communicated to relevant AI actors, including affected communities. Processes for tracking, responding to, and recovering from incidents and errors are followed and documented.

From the Core of Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0). The categories the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 Appendix A maps to, with their subcategories.

NIST text quoted from NIST AI 600-1 and NIST AI 100-1; public domain (works of the u.s. government), from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Category level only, quoted from the publications; the suggested actions are left out. The OWASP markers (● primary, ○ supporting) are from the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026, Appendix A (OWASP GenAI Security Project), under CC BY-SA 4.0. Navigation, not a compliance claim.