UTC

AML.T0124

Autonomous Attack Orchestration

Adversaries may use autonomous AI systems as an operational control layer to manage multiple distinct autonomous agents or sub-agents toward a common adversary-defined objective.

  • Tactic AI Attack Adaptation
  • Maturity: Realized
  • Predictive AI
  • Generative AI
  • Agentic AI
  • Enterprise
Full entry on MITRE ATLAS →
Mitigations
  • Enforce Access Controls for AI Agent ToolsAML.M0028

    Limit AI agent tool access to each caller's authorized, task-required operations and resources, including when tools are shared across agents, users, or tenants. Broader tool or backend privileges must not expand caller access. Enforce controls outside the model, in the tool implementation, MCP server, gateway, or underlying service.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Human In-the-Loop for AI Agent ActionsAML.M0029

    Systems should require the user or another human stakeholder to approve AI agent actions before the agent takes them. The human approver may be technical staff or business unit SMEs depending on the use case. Separate tools, such as dedicated audit agents, may assist human approval, but final adjudication should be conducted by a human decision-maker.

    Technical - AI

  • Segmentation of AI Agent ComponentsAML.M0032

    Define enforceable security boundaries around AI agent tools, data sources, identities, and execution environments. Mediate access through authenticated APIs, isolate code execution via containers or virtual machines, restrict filesystem and network access, and limit tool invocation rates.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Limit AI Workload Resource ConsumptionAML.M0036

    Limit the resources that an AI request, inference job, or agent workflow can consume. Set bounds on input size, batch size, execution time, memory, compute, and output size. Generative AI services should also limit context and output tokens.

    Technical - AI

  • AI Agent Authority Expansion ControlsAML.M0037

    Limit an AI agent's ability to autonomously acquire additional authorities that expand its effective permissions during execution. The maximum authority available to the agent should be explicitly granted prior to runtime.

    Technical - AI

  • AI Agent Scope Drift DetectionAML.M0038

    Continuously evaluate whether an AI Agent's planned actions remain consistent with its current authorized objective throughout execution. As autonomous agents interact within a dynamic environment, they may discover or generate intermediate objectives or adapt their strategy based on environment feedback.

    Technical - AI

  • Threat Intelligence ProgramAML.M0042

    A Threat Intelligence Program enables organizations to proactively collect, analyze, and share information on threats to AI and cyber systems by leveraging internal observations and external reporting.

    Policy

From MITRE ATLAS 2026.10, Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE, Apache License 2.0.