AML.T0101
Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation
Adversaries may invoke an AI agent's tool capable of performing mutative operations to perform Data Destruction. Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.
- Tactic Impact
- Maturity: Realized
- Agentic AI
- CriticalPraisonAI: AICoder Arbitrary File Write and Command Execution via LLM Tool Callspraisonai
- HighvLLM has remote code execution vulnerability in the tool call parser for Qwen3-Codervllm
- MediumMCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read and exfiltration via MCP tool callmcp-atlassian
- MediumOpenClaw ACP client has permission auto-approval bypass via untrusted tool metadataopenclaw
Published advisories whose titles describe the ShieldMap technique this maps to.
- AI Telemetry Logging and MonitoringAML.M0024
Implement logging and monitoring across the AI lifecycle to detect suspicious activity and support investigation. Capture security-relevant access, changes, and operations across data pipelines, model development, deployment, and connected systems.
Technical - Cyber
- Manage AI Agent Service AccessAML.M0026
Limit service AI agents--agents using independently assigned service or workload permissions--to explicitly authorized workflows. Agents may serve multiple users or act on requests, events, or schedules.
Technical - Cyber
- Manage User-Delegated AI Agent AccessAML.M0027
Limit user-delegated AI agents to explicitly authorized tasks and permissions. Apply the principle of least privilege so that the agent receives only the access required for its designated tasks. The user's permissions establish an upper bound; the agent should not automatically receive every permission available to that user.
Technical - Cyber
- Enforce Access Controls for AI Agent ToolsAML.M0028
Limit AI agent tool access to each caller's authorized, task-required operations and resources, including when tools are shared across agents, users, or tenants. Broader tool or backend privileges must not expand caller access. Enforce controls outside the model, in the tool implementation, MCP server, gateway, or underlying service.
Technical - Cyber
- Human In-the-Loop for AI Agent ActionsAML.M0029
Systems should require the user or another human stakeholder to approve AI agent actions before the agent takes them. The human approver may be technical staff or business unit SMEs depending on the use case. Separate tools, such as dedicated audit agents, may assist human approval, but final adjudication should be conducted by a human decision-maker.
Technical - AI
- Restrict AI Agent Tool Invocation on Untrusted DataAML.M0030
Untrusted data can contain prompt injections that invoke an AI agent's tools, potentially causing confidentiality, integrity or availability violations. It is recommended that tool invocation be restricted or limited when untrusted data enters the LLM's context.
Technical - AI
From MITRE ATLAS 2026.10, Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE, Apache License 2.0.