UTC

AML.T0080

AI Agent Context Poisoning

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the context used by an AI agent's large language model (LLM) to influence the responses it generates or actions it takes. This allows an adversary to persistently change the behavior of the target agent and further their goals.

  • Tactic Persistence
  • Maturity: Realized
  • Generative AI
  • Agentic AI
Full entry on MITRE ATLAS →
Real cases on the map
  1. HighSpring AI: Prompt Injection via Memory Poisoning in PromptChatMemoryAdvisororg.springframework.ai:spring-ai-client-chat, org.springframework.ai:spring-ai-client-chat
  2. HighOpen WebUI has Knowledge Base Destruction and RAG Poisoning via Unauthorized Collection Overwriteopen-webui

Published advisories whose titles describe the ShieldMap technique this maps to.

Mitigations
  • Generative AI GuardrailsAML.M0020

    Guardrails are safety controls placed between users, tools, and generative AI models to evaluate prompts, retrieved context, model outputs, and agent actions before they are accepted, executed, or shown to a user.

    Technical - AI

  • Memory HardeningAML.M0031

    Memory Hardening protects persistent state used by AI agents, including saved preferences, episodic or semantic memories, conversation summaries, stored chat history, and agent-managed experience stores.

    Technical - AI

  • AI Red TeamAML.M0035

    Establish an AI red team responsible for conducting recurring, authorized, and threat-informed red-teaming exercises to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in AI-enabled systems before deployment and throughout operation.

    Policy · Technical - AI · Technical - Cyber

From MITRE ATLAS 2026.10, Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE, Apache License 2.0.