AML.T0077
LLM Response Rendering
Adversaries may induce a large language model (LLM) to respond with private information structured in a reference to external content that, when rendered by the user's client, makes a request to an adversary-controlled server, exfiltrating the data.
- Tactic Exfiltration
- Maturity: Demonstrated
- Generative AI
- Agentic AI
Real cases on the map
- CriticalMCP Path Traversal Allows Full-Filesystem Read and JWT Secret Exfiltration Leading to Account Takeoverlangflow, langflow-base
- Critical@zereight/mcp-gitlab: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via `upload_markdown` enables PAT exfiltration and full account takeover@zereight/mcp-gitlab
- CriticalSSRF + LLM API key exfiltration via user-controlled basepath / baseUrl in 8 chat-model nodesflowise, flowise-components
- Criticalgemini-mcp-tool vulnerable to OS command injection and @file exfiltration via prompt quoting (CVE-2026-0755)gemini-mcp-tool
Published advisories whose titles describe the ShieldMap technique this maps to.
Mitigations
- Generative AI GuardrailsAML.M0020
Guardrails are safety controls placed between users, tools, and generative AI models to evaluate prompts, retrieved context, model outputs, and agent actions before they are accepted, executed, or shown to a user.
Technical - AI
From MITRE ATLAS 2026.10, Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE, Apache License 2.0.