UTC

AML.T0053

AI Agent Tool Invocation

Adversaries may use their access to an AI agent to invoke tools the agent has access to. LLMs are often connected to other services or resources via tools to increase their capabilities. Tools may include integrations with other applications, access to public or private data sources, and the ability to execute code.

  • Tactic Execution
  • Tactic Privilege Escalation
  • Tactic Lateral Movement
  • Maturity: Demonstrated
  • Agentic AI
Full entry on MITRE ATLAS →
Mitigations
  • Generative AI GuardrailsAML.M0020

    Guardrails are safety controls placed between users, tools, and generative AI models to evaluate prompts, retrieved context, model outputs, and agent actions before they are accepted, executed, or shown to a user.

    Technical - AI

  • Generative AI GuidelinesAML.M0021

    Guidelines are instructions, policies, and behavioral constraints provided to a generative AI model to direct it toward desired outputs and away from unsafe, unreliable, or policy-violating behavior.

    Technical - AI

  • Generative AI Model AlignmentAML.M0022

    Generative AI Model Alignment is the process of training or fine-tuning a generative model to guide its output toward a set of human values, goals, or ethical principles.

    Technical - AI

  • AI Telemetry Logging and MonitoringAML.M0024

    Implement logging and monitoring across the AI lifecycle to detect suspicious activity and support investigation. Capture security-relevant access, changes, and operations across data pipelines, model development, deployment, and connected systems.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Manage AI Agent Service AccessAML.M0026

    Limit service AI agents--agents using independently assigned service or workload permissions--to explicitly authorized workflows. Agents may serve multiple users or act on requests, events, or schedules.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Manage User-Delegated AI Agent AccessAML.M0027

    Limit user-delegated AI agents to explicitly authorized tasks and permissions. Apply the principle of least privilege so that the agent receives only the access required for its designated tasks. The user's permissions establish an upper bound; the agent should not automatically receive every permission available to that user.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Enforce Access Controls for AI Agent ToolsAML.M0028

    Limit AI agent tool access to each caller's authorized, task-required operations and resources, including when tools are shared across agents, users, or tenants. Broader tool or backend privileges must not expand caller access. Enforce controls outside the model, in the tool implementation, MCP server, gateway, or underlying service.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Human In-the-Loop for AI Agent ActionsAML.M0029

    Systems should require the user or another human stakeholder to approve AI agent actions before the agent takes them. The human approver may be technical staff or business unit SMEs depending on the use case. Separate tools, such as dedicated audit agents, may assist human approval, but final adjudication should be conducted by a human decision-maker.

    Technical - AI

  • Restrict AI Agent Tool Invocation on Untrusted DataAML.M0030

    Untrusted data can contain prompt injections that invoke an AI agent's tools, potentially causing confidentiality, integrity or availability violations. It is recommended that tool invocation be restricted or limited when untrusted data enters the LLM's context.

    Technical - AI

  • Segmentation of AI Agent ComponentsAML.M0032

    Define enforceable security boundaries around AI agent tools, data sources, identities, and execution environments. Mediate access through authenticated APIs, isolate code execution via containers or virtual machines, restrict filesystem and network access, and limit tool invocation rates.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Input and Output Validation for AI Agent ComponentsAML.M0033

    Implement validation on inputs and outputs for the tools and data sources used by AI agents. Validation includes enforcing a common data format, schema validation, checks for sensitive or prohibited information leakage, and data sanitization to remove potential injections or unsafe code.

    Technical - AI

  • AI Red TeamAML.M0035

    Establish an AI red team responsible for conducting recurring, authorized, and threat-informed red-teaming exercises to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in AI-enabled systems before deployment and throughout operation.

    Policy · Technical - AI · Technical - Cyber

  • AI Agent Scope Drift DetectionAML.M0038

    Continuously evaluate whether an AI Agent's planned actions remain consistent with its current authorized objective throughout execution. As autonomous agents interact within a dynamic environment, they may discover or generate intermediate objectives or adapt their strategy based on environment feedback.

    Technical - AI

From MITRE ATLAS 2026.10, Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE, Apache License 2.0.