UTC

AML.T0024

Exfiltration via AI Inference API

Adversaries may exfiltrate information from a victim-controlled AI model or service through responses returned by its inference API. Transferred information may include predictions, scores, embeddings, generated content (e.g. text or images), or other sensitive information disclosed in model responses.

  • Tactic Exfiltration
  • Maturity: Realized
  • Predictive AI
  • Generative AI
  • Agentic AI
Full entry on MITRE ATLAS →
Mitigations
  • Limit AI Service Query Volume and RateAML.M0004

    Limit the number and rate of requests that users can submit to an AI service. Apply limits by user, API key, tenant, device, or other authenticated identity. Use short-term rate, burst, and concurrency limits together with longer-term usage quotas.

    Technical - Cyber

  • Control Access to AI Models and Data in ProductionAML.M0019

    Require users to verify their identities before accessing a production model. Require authentication for API endpoints and monitor production model queries to ensure compliance with usage policies and to prevent model misuse.

    Policy

  • AI Telemetry Logging and MonitoringAML.M0024

    Implement logging and monitoring across the AI lifecycle to detect suspicious activity and support investigation. Capture security-relevant access, changes, and operations across data pipelines, model development, deployment, and connected systems.

    Technical - Cyber

  • AI Red TeamAML.M0035

    Establish an AI red team responsible for conducting recurring, authorized, and threat-informed red-teaming exercises to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in AI-enabled systems before deployment and throughout operation.

    Policy · Technical - AI · Technical - Cyber

From MITRE ATLAS 2026.10, Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE, Apache License 2.0.