AML.T0010.003
Supply Chain Compromise: Model Repository
Adversaries may abuse model repositories or other model distribution services to introduce compromised models into downstream AI systems. They may replace published artifacts, manipulate model versions or references that consumers resolve, or publish malicious models under identities or locations that consumers trust.
- Tactic Initial Access
- Maturity: Realized
- Predictive AI
- Generative AI
- Agentic AI
- CriticalMLflow: Unauthenticated full-read SSRF in webhook delivery: _validate_webhook_url bypassed via unvalidated HTTP redirects (and DNS rebindingmlflowExploited
- CriticalLiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verificationlitellmExploited
- CriticalMarimo: Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution via Terminal WebSocket Authentication BypassmarimoExploited
- CriticalUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow via Public Flow Build EndpointlangflowExploited
Published advisories whose titles describe the ShieldMap technique this maps to.
- Control Access to AI Models and Data at RestAML.M0005
Establish access controls on internal model registries and limit internal access to production models. Limit access to training data only to approved users.
Policy
- Validate AI ModelAML.M0008
Evaluate AI models against defined functional requirements before deployment and throughout their operational lifecycle. Validate newly trained or acquired models and repeat evaluation after fine-tuning, model updates, or changes to the conditions in which the model is used.
Technical - AI
- Code SigningAML.M0013
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing. Adversaries can embed malicious code in AI software or models. Developers should also cryptographically sign SBOM and AIBOM components that track model or data provenance.
Technical - Cyber
- Verify AI ArtifactsAML.M0014
Verify the integrity and authenticity of AI artifacts before importing, loading, or deploying them. Artifacts may include model weights and checkpoints, datasets, tokenizers, model configurations, prompt templates, and agent configuration files.
Technical - Cyber
- AI Model Distribution MethodsAML.M0017
Deploying AI models to edge devices can increase the attack surface of the system. Consider serving models in the cloud to reduce the level of access the adversary has to the model. Also consider computing features in the cloud to prevent gray-box attacks, where an adversary has access to the model preprocessing methods.
Policy
- Maintain an AI Bill of MaterialsAML.M0023
Create and maintain an AI Bill of Materials (AI BOM) that identifies the components and dependencies used to build, evaluate, and operate an AI-enabled system. Include models and checkpoints, datasets, software packages, inference runtimes, container images, and agent configurations including system instructions and connected tools and data sources.
Policy
- AI Red TeamAML.M0035
Establish an AI red team responsible for conducting recurring, authorized, and threat-informed red-teaming exercises to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in AI-enabled systems before deployment and throughout operation.
Policy · Technical - AI · Technical - Cyber
- Threat Intelligence ProgramAML.M0042
A Threat Intelligence Program enables organizations to proactively collect, analyze, and share information on threats to AI and cyber systems by leveraging internal observations and external reporting.
Policy
From MITRE ATLAS 2026.10, Copyright 2021-2026 MITRE, Apache License 2.0.