n8n: Authenticated Users Can Exhaust Temporary Disk Storage via Data-Table File Uploads
CVE-2026-58661 · GHSA-w867-jm58-p9pv · published 2026-07-22
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.39%
- Fixed in
- 2.28.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
An authenticated user can repeatedly upload files to the data-table upload endpoint, bypassing the per-request quota check, which does not account for files already written to the shared temporary directory. This causes temporary files to accumulate on disk until the periodic cleanup runs, potentially exhausting available disk space on the host.
Upgrade n8n to 2.28.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Users should upgrade to the patched version once available to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Set uploadMaxFileSize to a low value to limit individual upload size. Monitor and alert on disk usage in the n8n temporary upload directory. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.