Pydantic AI: SSRF cloud-metadata blocklist bypass via IPv6 zone identifiers
CVE-2026-107289 · GHSA-vmxc-h2x2-jmf3 · published 2026-10-08
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.8
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.39%
- Fixed in
- 2.44.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into local network access — either a FileUrl with forcedownload='allow-local', or webfetchtool(allowlocal_urls=True) — the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by appending an IPv6 zone identifier to a metadata address (for example fd00:ec2::254%251). The host ignores the zone identifier on a destination that is not link-local and delivers the request to the metadata endpoint anyway, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3 / CVE-2026-46678 and GHSA-cg7w-rg45-pc59 / CVE-2026-48782, themselves follow-ups to CVE-2026-25580.
Upgrade pydantic-ai to 2.44.0 or later, and pydantic-ai-slim to 2.44.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Upgrade to a patched version. The cloud-metadata and private-IP checks now drop an IPv6 zone identifier before evaluating the address, so every blocklist comparison is made on the address itself. A zone identifier is still carried on the connection, so legitimate link-local fetches under local network access continue to work.
Avoid opting into local network access — forcedownload='allow-local' or webfetchtool(allowlocal_urls=True) — on any URL that could be influenced by untrusted input. If you must, reject URL hosts containing % before constructing the FileUrl or configuring the tool.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pydantic-ai | PyPI | >= 1.56.0, < 1.107.6 | 1.107.6 |
| pydantic-ai | PyPI | >= 2.0.0b1, < 2.44.0 | 2.44.0 |
| pydantic-ai-slim | PyPI | >= 1.56.0, < 1.107.6 | 1.107.6 |
| pydantic-ai-slim | PyPI | >= 2.0.0b1, < 2.44.0 | 2.44.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.