PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
CVE-2026-57114 · GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v · published 2026-06-18 · updated 2026-07-20
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.2
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.26%
- Fixed in
- 4.6.59
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
If an attacker can submit jobs to a PraisonAI Jobs API deployment and choose webhook_url, they can cause the PraisonAI host to send POST requests to loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host. Practical impact includes: blind interaction with internal HTTP services; internal host/port reachability probing via timing and webhook error behavior; POSTing attacker-controlled job result payloads to internal APIs with weak request validation; cloud metadata interaction where metadata endpoints accept the request method and the deployment network permits access.
Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.59 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Move SSRF validation to the send path immediately before opening the outbound connection. Resolve all candidate addresses with socket.getaddrinfo(), not only the first IPv4 answer from gethostbyname(). Reject loopback, private, link-local, multicast, reserved, unspecified, and cloud metadata address ranges for every resolved address. Pin the validated address to the actual connection, or use a guarded HTTP transport/proxy that validates the destination after DNS resolution and before connect. Consider making Jobs API authentication mandatory by default for non-loopback binds, or require explicit opt-in to unauthenticated job submission.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonai | PyPI | >= 4.5.126, <= 4.6.58 | 4.6.59 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.