Langflow URL component: unbounded response size allows denial of service via memory exhaustion
GHSA-qvqp-mxh4-f27w · published 2026-11-05
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.5
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- 1.13.0
Denial of service through unbounded memory use (CWE-400 / CWE-770). Any user who can run a flow containing the URL component, or send chat input to a flow that exposes it as an Agent tool, can crash the Langflow instance for all users. On shared hosts, other services can be affected too. Confidentiality and integrity are not affected.
Upgrade langflow to 1.13.0 or later, and langflow-base to 1.13.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in Langflow 1.13.0 by #15436 (lfx.components.data_source.url): Bounded, streamed reads. Response bodies are streamed and rejected once they exceed a per-response limit, checked on both the encoded (on-the-wire) and decoded size. An oversized Content-Length is rejected before any body is read. Shared budget per fetch. All URLs and crawled pages of one fetch share a total byte budget. Each response is charged the larger of its encoded and decoded sizes, including rejected responses, and the crawl stops once the budget is spent. Configurable limits. (default 10 MiB) and LANGFLOW_URL_COMPONENT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES (default 100 MiB). Both must be positive integers. …
Do not expose flows that use the URL component (directly or as an Agent tool) to untrusted users. Avoid making them public or shared. Run Langflow with a container/cgroup memory limit, so the worst case is a restart of the Langflow container rather than the whole host running out of memory. Where possible, restrict outbound HTTP from the Langflow host with an egress proxy that enforces a maximum response size.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| langflow | PyPI | >= 1.0.0a0, < 1.13.0 | 1.13.0 |
| langflow-base | PyPI | < 1.13.0 | 1.13.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (published by Langflow). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.