JupyterLab: Command link trust prompt in JupyterLab can trust a document other than the one clicked
CVE-2026-102832 · GHSA-jwrc-gm9j-263p · published 2026-10-15
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 4.2
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.14%
- Fixed in
- 4.6.4
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
The user loses control over which document they trusted. Every button in the document that was (incorrectly) marked as trusted runs from then on without a prompt, so if that document also came from an untrusted source, its buttons fire on a single click with no confirmation. That is the state the prompt was added to prevent, in GHSA-mqcg-5x36-vfcg. The command that ran had the user's consent, because the prompt named it and they pressed Trust. The document they were reading stays untrusted, so it prompts again on the next click.
Upgrade jupyterlab to 4.6.4 or later, and notebook to 7.6.3 or later.
JupyterLab v4.6.4 and v4.5.11 contain the patch. The trust request now carries the document that was clicked, and the command is run only once that same document has been marked. Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.
Given the high complexity of a potential exploit, we advise treating this as a defense in-depth and update at earliest opportunity, rather than apply the workarounds listed below. However, for users running in highly sensitive environments who are unable to upgrade the workarounds are included below. Turn off command linker, which removes the ability to execute frontend commands altogether: In such configuration the buttons in Markdown files and notebook outputs then do nothing when clicked. Documentation and extensions that use command links for navigation stop working, and the setting applies to every document, not only untrusted ones.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| jupyterlab | PyPI | >= 4.5.7, <= 4.5.10 | 4.5.11 |
| jupyterlab | PyPI | >= 4.6.0, <= 4.6.3 | 4.6.4 |
| notebook | PyPI | >= 7.5.6, <= 7.6.2 | 7.6.3 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.