@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory
CVE-2026-61647 · GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq · published 2026-09-22
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.44%
- Fixed in
- 2.0.3
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
File write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation. The vulnerability exists from v1.6.0 (when the HTTP /batch-to-vault endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the batchtovault MCP tool) through v2.0.2.
Upgrade @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp to 2.0.3 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in v2.0.3: Opt-in containment via NOTEBOOKLMVAULTROOT env var. When set, vaultdir is resolved relative to that root and realpath-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or .. segments outside the root are rejected with a clear error. slugprefix is always sanitized. Path separators (/, \), .. sequences and NUL bytes are stripped, length capped at 64 characters. This applies regardless of whether NOTEBOOKLMVAULTROOT is set. 15 unit tests in src/tests/vault-writer.test.ts cover the escape vectors (absolute paths, sibling-prefix attacks, .. traversal, NUL/separator stripping).
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp | npm | >= 1.6.0, < 2.0.3 | 2.0.3 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.