n8n: Unauthenticated Persistent Storage Exhaustion via OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint
CVE-2026-86075 · GHSA-hh89-3r9w-qj3j · published 2026-09-10
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.7
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.61%
- Fixed in
- 2.38.2
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
The OAuth Dynamic Client Registration endpoints validated field sizes only for redirecturis, leaving clientname and granttypes bounded by presence checks alone. An unauthenticated remote caller could submit arbitrarily large values in either field and have them persisted to the database. Repeated registration therefore grew persistent storage without limit and without any account on the instance. The patch caps clientname at its column length and limits grant_types to the grant types the server actually implements, with the array capped at that count.
Upgrade n8n to 2.38.2 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict network access to the n8n instance so that only trusted clients can reach it. Place the instance behind a reverse proxy configured to enforce strict request body size limits below the default 16 MiB. Monitor database size for unexpected growth and audit the oauth_clients table for anomalous entries. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
- HightsParticles: Unbounded HTTP Request Body Buffering in @tsparticles/mcp-server Leads to Remote DoS@tsparticles/mcp-server
- HighMissing request-wide media budget allows single-request frontend resource exhaustionvllm
- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: HTTP server transports and handlers did not limit request body size or JSON-RPC batch length@modelcontextprotocol/hono, @modelcontextprotocol/node, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighvLLM : DoS via unvalidated mm_processor_kwargs in multimodal image processors (Isaac, InternVL, H2OVL, etc.)vllm
- HighMCP TypeScript SDK: One HTTP request within the default size limit could exhaust server memory during validation@modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @modelcontextprotocol/server
- HighFrame-count cap bypass in VideoMediaIO.load_base64 for video/jpeg via media_io_kwargs.video.num_framesvllm
- Criticaln8n Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Expression Injectionn8n, n8nExploited
- Criticaln8n Has an Arbitrary File Read via Git Noden8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n: HTTP Request Node Pagination Prototype Pollution to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n Has an XML Node Prototype Pollution Patch Bypassn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has XML Node Prototype Pollution that to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
- Criticaln8n has Prototype Pollution in XML Webhook Body Parser that Leads to RCEn8n, n8n, n8n
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.