mcp-shell — Security Disabled by Default in Bare-Binary Deploy Path + Shell Interpreter in Secure-Mode Allowlist
CVE-2026-55580 · GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m · published 2026-08-25
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.6
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.20%
- Fixed in
- 0.6.0
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
mcp-shell — Security Disabled by Default in Bare-Binary Deploy Path + Shell Interpreter in Secure-Mode Allowlist. The source advisory has the full description.
Upgrade github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell to 0.6.0 or later.
The sandbox-mitigation framing assumes the operator (a) knows they need to sandbox, (b) sets up the sandbox correctly, and (c) the sandbox boundary actually contains what an attacker can reach via the MCP tool. None of those hold for the documented install path: 1. Default-off applies before the sandbox question is even asked. The from-source path (git clone && make install && mcp-shell) runs with Enabled: false from config.go:49. The MCP client config example in the README passes only MCPSHELLLOGLEVEL, no MCPSHELLSECCONFIGFILE.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell | Go | < 0.6.0 | 0.6.0 |
- CriticalUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow via Public Flow Build EndpointlangflowExploited
- CriticalRay is vulnerable to Critical RCE via Safari & Firefox Browsers through DNS Rebinding AttackrayExploited
- CriticalLangflow Unauth RCElangflow, langflow-baseExploited
- HighLiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpointslitellmExploited
- CriticalMLflow vulnerable to remote code execution on unauthenticated servers via third-party scorer deserialization importing caller-placed artifacmlflow
- CriticalAgno: Arbitrary code execution via `eval()` on `field_type` in `FunctionCall`agno
- Highmcp-shell has a Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Default `/bin/bash` Executablegithub.com/sonirico/mcp-shell
- Highmcp-shell has a Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Git Shell Aliasgithub.com/sonirico/mcp-shell
The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.