godot-mcp has Command Injection via unsanitized projectPath
CVE-2026-25546 · GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928 · published 2026-02-04 · updated 2026-02-08
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.8
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.95%
- Fixed in
- 0.1.1
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
A Command Injection vulnerability in godot-mcp allows remote code execution. The executeOperation function passed user-controlled input (e.g., projectPath) directly to exec(), which spawns a shell. This affects any tool that accepts projectPath, including createscene, addnode, load_sprite, and others.
Upgrade @coding-solo/godot-mcp to 0.1.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
Fixed in version 0.1.1 by switching from exec() to execFile(), which does not invoke a shell.
None. Users should upgrade immediately.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @coding-solo/godot-mcp | npm | < 0.1.1 | 0.1.1 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.