LiteLLM: Custom Code Guardrails production endpoints bypass code safety checks
CVE-2026-59821 · GHSA-72m8-9m7m-h278 · published 2026-07-22
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS score
- 2.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.90%
- Fixed in
- 1.82.0
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
LiteLLM's Custom Code Guardrails production create/update paths did not apply the same sandboxing and validation used by the test endpoint. A privileged user with access to create or update guardrails could submit custom Python code that executed in the LiteLLM proxy environment. In deployments without a configured master key, callers could be treated as proxy administrators, making this reachable without intended administrative authorization. This could allow arbitrary code execution in the LiteLLM proxy container and exposure of secrets available to the process.
Upgrade litellm to 1.82.0 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue is fixed in 1.82.0-stable. LiteLLM recommend upgrading to 1.82.0-stable or later.
If upgrading is not immediately possible: 1. Restrict access to POST /guardrails and PUT /guardrails/{guardrailid} to trusted administrators only. 2. Ensure LITELLMMASTER_KEY is configured. 3. Avoid enabling Custom Code Guardrails for untrusted users.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| litellm | PyPI | < 1.82.0 | 1.82.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.