n8n: Prototype Pollution via Workflow Structure Summary Can Lead to Denial of Service
CVE-2026-86078 · GHSA-679f-58pq-4v2c · published 2026-09-10
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.0
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.59%
- Fixed in
- 2.38.2
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
The Instance AI workflow summary built its result with get-or-create-then-nested-write idioms keyed by node names and connection keys taken from the stored workflow. Those are arbitrary strings: the restricted-name guard n8n shows in the editor is client-side and is bypassed by posting the workflow to the REST API directly. So a reserved key such as proto resolved up the prototype chain instead of creating an own key, and the write landed on Object.prototype in the main n8n process, affecting every later request. The patch builds the summary with null-prototype accumulators and validates the keys it accepts, so reserved names cannot reach the prototype chain.
Upgrade n8n to 2.38.2 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. Remove or leave unconfigured the N8NINSTANCEAIMODEL environment variables to prevent the Instance AI module from reaching the vulnerable code path. Restart the n8n process to clear any in-memory prototype pollution if an attack is suspected. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.