UTC
Medium

Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets

CVE-2026-88001 · GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w · published 2026-09-09

Severity
Medium
CVSS score
5.0
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.38%
Fixed in
0.11.1
  • Exploitation Public proof of concept
  • Automatable No
  • Technical impact Partial
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

An authenticated user can make the server issue requests to hosts the operator deliberately excluded, and to addresses on the internal network including loopback, private ranges and the cloud metadata endpoints of the major providers. What reaches the attacker depends on which HTTP client the fetch path uses, and is stated here as verified rather than assumed. On the paths built on requests, the fetched body is returned to the caller, so the response of an excluded host is readable: the built-in page fetch tool hands it to the model, and the URL ingestion endpoint returns it in its response.

What to do

Upgrade open-webui to 0.11.1 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

Fixed in 0.11.1 by https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/27823. The excluded-host list is now evaluated once per request on both HTTP clients, where the real destination is known and a reused connection cannot skip it, so it applies to every redirect hop. The private-address check stays at connection time and is now hooked where aiohttp resolves a host, which is also reached for hosts written as IP literals. One case is not resolved by the upgrade alone. Where the server reaches the internet through a forward proxy, the private-address check sees the proxy's address rather than the final destination, so it does not constrain where the proxy is asked to connect.

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
open-webuiPyPI>= 0.9.5, <= 0.11.00.11.1

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].