LiteLLM: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in Skills archive extraction
CVE-2026-59820 · GHSA-5jmr-gcrj-2c9q · published 2026-07-22
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.1
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.59%
- Fixed in
- 1.83.7
- Exploitation No known exploitation
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
LiteLLM Skills archive extraction did not sufficiently validate file paths from uploaded skill ZIP archives. An authenticated user with access to LiteLLM LLM API routes, or a key whose allowedroutes includes /v1/skills, anthropicroutes, or llmapiroutes, could upload a crafted skill archive containing path traversal entries. When the skill was processed for execution, those entries could be written outside the intended extraction/staging directory. This could allow arbitrary file write and may lead to code execution depending on deployment configuration and writable paths.
Upgrade litellm to 1.83.7 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
The issue is fixed in 1.83.7-stable. LiteLLM recommens upgrading to 1.83.7-stable or later.
If upgrading is not immediately possible: 1. Block POST /v1/skills at your reverse proxy or API gateway. 2. Restrict Skills API access to trusted users only.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| litellm | PyPI | < 1.83.7 | 1.83.7 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.