MCP Ruby SDK: Unbounded session retention in StreamableHTTPTransport allows memory exhaustion via initialize flood
CVE-2026-67430 · GHSA-52jp-gj8w-j6xh · published 2026-07-30
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 5.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.37%
- Fixed in
- 0.23.0
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable Yes
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
Attacker requirements: unauthenticated TCP reach of the MCP endpoint. No session, no credentials. Effect: memory-exhaustion denial of service. A sustained or distributed attacker can OOM the worker; on services that recycle workers, the attacker simply repeats. On multi-tenant gateways, one tenant can starve all others. Affected deployments: every deployment that does not opt into sessionidletimeout. Because the README presents this as an opt-in mitigation rather than a default, real-world deployments are likely to ship vulnerable.
Upgrade mcp to 0.23.0 or later.
1. Change the default of sessionidletimeout to a finite value (e.g. 30 minutes) and document the change as a security default. 2. Add a max_sessions: constructor option; reject initialize with HTTP 503 once the cap is reached. 3. Track the time of the initialize POST separately from later request activity, and evict sessions whose GET SSE stream is never attached within N seconds.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| mcp | RubyGems | <= 0.22.0 | 0.23.0 |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.