PraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory
CVE-2026-39306 · GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534 · published 2026-04-06 · updated 2026-04-07
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 7.3
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.30%
- Fixed in
- 4.5.113
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Partial
- CISA SSVC
This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe pull workflow. Impacted parties: Users who pull recipes from an untrusted or shared PraisonAI registry. Teams running internal registries where one publisher can influence what other users pull. Automated systems or CI jobs that fetch recipes into working directories near sensitive project files. Security impact: Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the expected extraction directory. Availability impact is significant if the overwritten target is a config file, project file, startup script, or another operational artifact.
Upgrade praisonai to 4.5.113 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.
1. Replace raw tar.extractall() with a safe extraction routine that validates every TarInfo member before extraction. Reject absolute paths, .. segments, and any resolved path that escapes the intended extraction directory. 2. Apply the same archive member validation in both LocalRegistry.pull() and HttpRegistry.pull() so that local and remote registry clients share the same safety guarantees. 3. Consider validating tar contents during publish as well, so malicious bundles are rejected before they ever enter the registry and cannot be served to downstream users.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| praisonai | PyPI | <= 4.5.112 | 4.5.113 |
1 registered MCP server installs an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.