wireshark-mcp vulnerable to arbitrary file write via export_objects when WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is not configured
CVE-2026-43901 · GHSA-3r68-x3xc-rxpg · published 2026-05-05 · updated 2026-05-13
- Severity
- Medium
- CVSS score
- 6.8
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Fixed in
- No fix yet
- Exploitation Public proof of concept
- Automatable No
- Technical impact Total
- CISA SSVC
wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark's --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction. The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.
No fixed release is listed yet for wireshark-mcp. Follow the source advisory for updates, and until one ships:
Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS to a restricted safe directory before starting the server: export WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS=/tmp/wireshark_mcp_safe This activates the existing sandbox and blocks writes outside the allowed path.
General guidance from ShieldPi, not a vendor fix
- Path traversal. Limit the folders it can reach at the operating-system level, such as a container or a user with access to only those folders, and keep credentials and keys outside them.
Not yet patched.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| wireshark-mcp | PyPI | <= 1.1.5 | No fix yet |
1 registered MCP server installs an affected version today, by the dependency versions a fresh install resolves.
- io.github.bx33661/wireshark-mcpwireshark-mcp@0.6.5
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.