n8n: Execute Command Node Allows Authenticated Users to Run Arbitrary Commands on Host
GHSA-365g-vjw2-grx8 · published 2025-10-09
- Severity
- High
- CVSS score
- 8.8
- Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
- No CVE
- Fixed in
- No fix yet
The Execute Command node in n8n allows execution of arbitrary commands on the host system where n8n runs. While this functionality is intended for advanced automation and can be useful in certain workflows, it poses a security risk if all users with access to the n8n instance are not fully trusted. An attacker—either a malicious user or someone who has compromised a legitimate user account—could exploit this node to run arbitrary commands on the host machine, potentially leading to data exfiltration, service disruption, or full system compromise. …
No fixed release is listed yet for n8n. Follow the source advisory for updates, and until one ships:
Administrators can disable the Execute Command node by setting the following environment variable before starting n8n: export NODES_EXCLUDE: "[\"n8n-nodes-base.executeCommand\"]"
General guidance from ShieldPi, not a vendor fix
- Command or code injection. Remove or disable the affected server or tool, or run it in a sandbox with no secrets in its environment.
No code changes have been made to alter the behavior of the Execute Command node. The recommended mitigation is to disable the node by default in environments where it is not explicitly required. Future n8n versions may change the default availability of this node.
| Package | Registry | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| n8n | npm | <= 1.114.4 | No fix yet |
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The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.