UTC
High

LangSmith SDK: Public prompt pull deserializes untrusted manifests without trust boundary warning

CVE-2026-45134 · GHSA-3644-q5cj-c5c7 · published 2026-05-13 · updated 2026-06-08

Severity
High
CVSS score
7.1
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)
0.20%
Fixed in
0.8.0
  • Exploitation No known exploitation
  • Automatable No
  • Technical impact Partial
  • CISA SSVC
What it is

An attacker who publishes a malicious prompt to LangSmith Hub may be able to affect applications that pull that prompt by owner/name. If the prompt manifest reaches the SDK's deserialization path, the SDK will instantiate the referenced LangChain objects with the attacker-supplied constructor arguments rather than treating the manifest as inert data. Realistic impacts include: Server-side request forgery (SSRF), outbound request redirection, and interception of LLM traffic if a prompt manifest configures an LLM client with an attacker-controlled base_url, proxy, or equivalent endpoint-setting parameter. …

What to do

Upgrade langsmith to 0.8.0 or later, and langchain to 0.3.30 or later. If you start it from an MCP config with npx or uvx, pin that version so an old cached copy is not used.

The LangSmith SDK now blocks pulling public prompts by owner/name by default. Callers must explicitly opt in by passing dangerously_pull_public_prompt=True (Python) or dangerouslyPullPublicPrompt: true (JS/TS) to acknowledge the trust boundary. This flag should only be set after reviewing and trusting the prompt contents, not merely the publishing account. Upgrade to LangSmith SDK Python >= 0.8.0 or JS/TS >= 0.6.0.

Affected
PackageRegistryAffectedFixed in
langsmithPyPI< 0.8.00.8.0
langchainPyPI< 0.3.300.3.30

The impact, patch and workaround text comes from the advisory, shortened (GitHub Advisory Database, CC BY 4.0). Proof-of-concept and reproduction sections and code are left out; the original advisory has them.

Sources: GitHub Advisory Database, reviewed and malware advisories (CC BY 4.0, https://github.com/advisories); advisories published by Cursor (https://github.com/cursor/cursor/security/advisories); advisories published by OpenClaw (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories); advisories published by vLLM (https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories); advisories published by Open WebUI (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories); advisories published by n8n (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories); advisories published by Flowise (https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories); advisories published by Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories); advisories published by the MCP Python SDK project (https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories); advisories published by MLflow (https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (CC0). Data as of 2026-11-22. ShieldMap describes how each problem works and how to fix it; it does not publish exploit code. Report a correction to [email protected].